A collection of notes on political theory, with the following table of contents:
Applications of Political Theory and Philosophy
Dissecting Justice—Rawls Versus Nozick
Freedom, Capabilities, and Functionings
On Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice
Defining and Differentiating Discrimination
A Brief Note on Gender, Justice, and Feminism
The Moral Dilemmas of Paternalistic Interventions
Who Governs Whom?—The Meta-Order of Democratic Decision-Making
The Mechanics of Tolerance—Objection, Acceptance, and Rejection
Bibliography
Applications of Political Theory and Philosophy
Political theory can justify rights and duties in society. This involves a systematic and rational approach, rather than basing norms solely on subjective moral intuitions. There is an important distinction between political science, theory, and philosophy. Political science is primarily empirical, focusing on testability, causality, and similar concepts. Political theory is not necessarily empirically testable, but it can refer to empirical findings as part of theory development. There are important distinctions between political science and political theory (or philosophy).
Not all scientific knowledge is empirically based; mathematical rules, for example, are derived from logical reasoning rather than empirical observation. Additionally, not all political theory and philosophy are normative. Conceptual analysis, which focuses on clarifying and defining concepts rather than prescribing norms or values, is a prime example. Furthermore, political theory often employs methods closely related to the hypothetico-deductive method, which involves formulating hypotheses and deducing their implications for further testing or exploration.
The structure of the hypothetico-deductive method can be described as follows. First, a hypothesis (H) is proposed based on an existing theory. From this hypothesis, an implication (I) is deduced, linking the hypothesis to the established theory. During the investigation, one can observe either implication (I) or not-I. If implication (I) is observed, the hypothesis (H) is strengthened, though it is neither conclusively proven nor falsified. The observation of I lends credence to the hypothesis, but it does not confirm it definitively due to the possibility of alternative explanations or future disconfirming evidence. However, if not-I is observed, the hypothesis (H) is disproved. The occurrence of not-I directly contradicts the hypothesis, showing that it is incorrect. In essence, the hypothetico-deductive method highlights the process of proposing a hypothesis, deducing implications, testing them through observation, and using the results to support or refute the hypothesis.
Some approach the difference between political theory and philosophy agnostically, meaning they avoid taking a stance on what the actual difference is. Political theory and philosophy, while inherently interconnected, exhibit distinct characteristics that set them apart in their approach and focus. One fundamental difference lies in their engagement with empirical facts. Political theory often integrates empirical data to analyze and understand political systems and behaviors. This empirical grounding allows political theorists to explore how political processes unfold in real-world scenarios, providing insights into the practical workings of governance.
In contrast, philosophy engages with empirical facts in a more abstract or critical manner. Philosophers might question the foundational assumptions behind these facts, exploring their broader implications without necessarily being constrained by empirical evidence. Institutions also play divergent roles in each discipline. Political theory frequently concentrates on the structure, function, and impact of political institutions, emphasizing their practical implications. Political theorists analyze how institutions shape and are shaped by political behavior, focusing on their role in achieving governance objectives. Conversely, philosophy might examine institutions from a more conceptual or normative perspective. Philosophers are inclined to interrogate the ethical foundations and underlying principles of institutions, pondering their legitimacy, justice, and moral significance.
As an example of political philosophy, Peter Singer, argues that if you see a child drowning in a pond, your moral intuition will tell you that you should save the child, even if it means getting your pants wet or being late for work. Singer appeals to human moral intuitions here. Most people would think “so far so good” in Singer’s argumentation. However, Singer further argues that this line of thought obligates people to make sacrifices to help the world’s poor. According to Singer’s argument, it does not make sense to buy the latest iPhone or expensive jeans because, just like the “drowning child,” humans are obligated to help those in poverty, those who are starving, or similar.
Regarding Singer’s argument about morality, several objections emerge. Firstly, there is the radicality objection, which states that Singer’s argumentation is simply too radical in its conclusions based on assumptions about human moral intuitions. There is also the counter-productivity objection, which points out that the described moral code exceeds what can be considered the capacity of the average citizen. In this regard, it can be argued that it undermines “compliance.”
However, according to Singer, it can be counter-argued against the counter-productivity objection that a moral standard can indeed affect people’s moral capacity. For example, consider gender roles in a historical context. It was once not the moral standard for men to participate in specific household tasks such as cooking or caring for children. However, with a more modern moral standard, it is now far more realistic to think that men contribute to household chores; this change in moral standards has indeed contributed to a change in men’s moral capacity and actions.
Additionally, there is the option objection, which argues that Singer’s theory robs people of the opportunity to live their own lives on their own terms. The idea that a person is always obligated to help the hungry and poor instead of living their own life is not necessarily beneficial for the individual. Singer would likely respond to this argument by pointing out that it is true that there is a radical change, but there is also the limitation that the helper should not put themselves in a worse position than those being helped.
History is another area where these fields diverge. Political theorists often contextualize their analyses within specific historical frameworks, examining how historical events and developments influence political ideas and practices. This historical grounding helps political theorists understand the evolution of political thought and its practical implications. Philosophers, however, might approach history more as a source of timeless questions and philosophical problems. They are often more interested in the enduring issues that historical events raise, rather than in the specific historical context itself.
The degree of exactness may also vary between the two disciplines. Political theory tends to seek a higher level of precision in its analysis, aiming for clear and concrete conclusions about political phenomena. Political theorists strive for analytical rigor, employing systematic methods to dissect political concepts and systems. Philosophy, on the other hand, often embraces a broader and more speculative approach, allowing for ambiguity and open-ended interpretation. Philosophers are comfortable with exploring uncertainties and the complexity of ideas without necessarily seeking definitive answers.
Lastly, political theory and philosophy belong to different intellectual traditions and schools of thought. Political theory is closely tied to the practical concerns of governance and political life, drawing from a range of empirical and normative sources. It encompasses various traditions that address the practicalities of political existence. Philosophy, in contrast, spans a wider array of traditions, from metaphysics and epistemology to ethics and aesthetics. Each of these philosophical subfields has its own methods, priorities, and areas of focus, making philosophy a more diverse and expansive field of inquiry.
G. A. Cohen believes that when conducting political theory and philosophy, it is crucial to distinguish between three different questions to gain insight into the purpose of the presented philosophy or theory. These questions are:
What is justice?
What should the state do?
What social conditions should be provided?
The first question concerns the correct principles of justice, while the second specifically addresses the role and actions of the state. The third question pertains to the social conditions that should be established. In political theory, it is essential to distinguish between what is being discussed and which question is being asked. Cohen also writes about political philosophy, noting that some of the most successful philosophical interventions have consisted of pointing out that “the emperor’s not wearing any clothes” (Cohen, 2011, p. 226).
Cohen points out that when engaging in political philosophy or theory, it is a good idea to think about what you achieve by presenting your argument. This is the purpose of Cohen’s model: to be precise about how your argument supports your position or attacks the opponent’s position. Cohen also argues that the state has other tasks besides justice. At times, the state should not aim for justice, as the state cannot necessarily provide justice on its own. Thus, Cohen opposes John Rawls’ idea that the state should seek to provide justice. Cohen also presents arguments that it is not always beneficial to aim for socially just conditions, including highlighting perfectionist reasons. Cohen believes there should be an awareness of whether your argument merely shows weaknesses in the opponent’s argument or directly disproves the opponent’s argumentation.
When developing political theory, various overarching approaches can be applied. One such approach is Cohen’s apprenticeship model, where political theory is learned through practice and mentorship. This involves developing theory, receiving feedback, and learning from established theorists. For example, it might include studying how great thinkers like Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls, and others have worked. Another approach is Robert Goodin’s, which can be characterized by the slogan “just do it.” This entails a practical and direct approach to theoretical work, where active engagement in the theory is central. Williams’ focus is on the integration of action into the theory, emphasizing how theoretical concepts are applied in practice. John Rawls offers a historical perspective, emphasizing the importance of learning from past philosophical attempts. He believes that theoretical work should take its starting point from previous thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant. This perspective highlights the continuity and development in political thinking over time.
Dissecting Justice—Rawls Versus Nozick
Before John Rawls' theory of justice, theories such as utilitarianism had gained prominence. Although there are several versions of utilitarianism, it can generally be said that utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist ethics that seeks to maximize happiness or utility for the greatest number of people. Justice according to utilitarianism thus involves maximizing happiness or utility for the greatest number, even if this, for example, comes at the expense of a minority in society. Critics of utilitarianism have pointed out that this ethical approach can lead to arguments for slavery if it maximizes overall happiness or utility. It could also be useful according to utilitarianism to kill a person to harvest their organs and thus save five other lives.
Rawls also criticized utilitarianism. One of the problems with this consequentialist approach was the lack of theorization of rights and other essential principles of justice. According to this argument, it can be pointed out that certain rights should be upheld regardless of the maximization of happiness. Rawls formulates the question: what does justice look like in a society? Rawls published his book "A Theory of Justice" in 1971, in which he theorizes what a just society would look like. Rawls draws inspiration from the contract tradition. Central figures in this area include Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. However, Rawls deviates from the original position or state of nature as presented by earlier thinkers (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 27).
In Rawls' contract, aspects such as a general presumption of moral argumentation, the veil of ignorance, and how people should have access to primary goods can be highlighted. The original position and the veil of ignorance are core elements in Rawls' theory of justice. A central mechanism in Rawls' original position is his social contract description of justice as "justice as fairness." The original position is formulated to create a fair and impartial perspective, which is essential in reaching principles of justice. Here, according to Rawls, we should imagine ourselves as free and equal persons agreeing on two principles of justice. However, it is often depicted as three principles: the principle of equal liberty, the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 29).
The principle of equal liberty can be described as a fundamental liberal principle that states that each person's freedom should be as extensive as possible for all, meaning equal freedom. Examples of this are the rights to freedom of thought and speech (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 30). The principle of equal liberty also implies that everyone should have the freedom to pursue their own life plan, as long as it does not harm others. Individuals or the state should not seek to limit a person who wants to live according to certain life views. The principle of fair equality of opportunity states, among other things, that there should be no discrimination. For example, a candidate should not be discriminated against based on gender, skin color, or other parameters that can lead to arbitrary discrimination. But there is more to equality of opportunity than that. It is also essential that social circumstances do not diminish a citizen's opportunities compared to others. The difference principle, which is Rawls' most controversial principle, entails that the inequality that occurs must be such that the worst-off are as well off as possible. If there is an alternative where the worst-off can be better off, that alternative is preferable.
Here, the maximin principle may be of relevance as a broader decision-making rule applied in the original position, a hypothetical scenario to derive principles of justice. The difference principle, on the other hand, is a specific principle derived from the original position to guide the distribution of economic and social resources in a society. The maximin rule entails that under given circumstances, it is rational to choose the distribution whereby the worst position is as good as possible (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 35).
Let us imagine a society where there is a large gap between the rich and the poor, where the worst-off live in miserable conditions, such as having no access to health, education, or housing, compared to a society where the rich do not accumulate enormous wealth, but at the same time, the worst-off in society have access to health, education, and housing. It would be argued that the latter societal model is preferable, even if it comes at the expense of the wealthy in society. The rationale here is that the worst-off achieve the best conditions under the second societal model. However, this example may admittedly be oversimplified, as it is a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the maximin rule. The reasoning of the maximin rule can also be criticized for not necessarily being beneficial, if it drastically reduces the wealth of the best-off in society just for a small insignificant improvement for the worst-off.
In connection with Rawls' theory of justice, he also introduces the concept of the veil of ignorance. This concept is based on a thought experiment where people make decisions by imagining that their personal characteristics, social status, and similar factors are unknown. The intention here is to ensure impartial evaluations of justice, as the individuals involved do not know their social, cultural, or historical circumstances. Rawls theorizes that when there is no knowledge of one's given interests in advance, it becomes easier to make just decisions. To summarize, Rawls argues that the principles of justice have a specific ranking as follows: 1) the principle of equal liberty, 2) the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and 3) the difference principle. It can also be pointed out that the first principle must be fully satisfied before working towards the next principle. According to this logic, it is not desirable to weaken the principle of equal liberty in favor of the difference principle in a society. Two main arguments underpin this ranking: the contract argument and the intuitive argument.
The intuitive argument posits that some fundamental liberal institutions must exist. In Rawls' theory of justice, justice and fairness are highlighted, including the expression "justice as fairness," which is the title of an essay by Rawls in which he conceptualizes justice. Justice as fairness excludes institutions based on slavery; the inequality here cannot justify the benefits experienced by others. In his theory, Rawls points out that institutions should coexist in such a way that no one can reasonably reject this state as unfair. Rawls assumes that humans are rational and self-interested. For people to pursue their so-called life plans, primary goods must be considered.
A central critique of Rawls' theory of justice concerns his contract argument. Here, a critique can be raised of the maximin rule, which some may think is too conservative. Additionally, there could be criticism that Rawls constructed a contract in such a way that fits with his theory in advance based on his desired results. Rawls partially admits that the contract is constructed; the intuitive argument, which deals with what is intuitively acceptable, can be highlighted as an example (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 42). The responsibility critique, raised by some theorists, further addresses whether people exercise their own responsibility. It can be pointed out that another cause for being disadvantaged, besides circumstances, could be one's own choices and exercise of responsibility (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 39). However, it is imagined in practice that it would be difficult to examine whether one's societal position is caused by personal responsibility, societal circumstances, or a combination thereof. Rawls points out that due to various innate and social conditions, there are not many choices for which people can be directly responsible.
G.A. Cohen also raised a critique of Rawls' theory in the form of what is called the incentives critique. To illustrate this critique, Rawls' original position can be highlighted, in which he argues that an equal distribution of primary goods is a natural result thereof. However, the incentives critique argues that if incentives are not present, the total gains from cooperation could be smaller, which could result in the worst-off receiving a smaller share. In this regard, the Pareto argument for inequality can be highlighted: though there is inequality, everyone becomes richer. The critique is based on the idea that talented individuals will work less hard without incentives to utilize their potential. Rawls argues that talent is a lottery, but as long as the worst-off are as well off as possible, it can be advantageous to have incentives for everyone in society.
Robert Nozick is a key figure in philosophical libertarianism, drawing from contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 51). Nozick raised various critiques of Rawls, especially the difference principle and Rawls' ideas on redistribution, arguing that they violate individuals' freedom rights (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 54). Nozick's assumption about resources is that the world's resources are unowned, not collectively owned, and thus "up for grabs." Nozick's political philosophy is also based on a contract position, but not like Rawls' theory of the original position or "veil of ignorance."
Nozick describes a state of nature where there is initially a form of anarchy, after which people come together in small communities that grow over time. He argues that eventually, a larger community will emerge and incorporate others. This is not unjust according to Nozick, as the established state appears as the most efficient option. Rawls writes about "justice as fairness"; if we compare this with Nozick, it could be argued that he advocates for "justice, not fairness" (the latter is not an actual quote from Nozick, but an interpretation of his political philosophy).
Nozick criticizes Rawls on the following points: (1) Rawls' theory violates Kant's categorical imperative, (2) there is a violation of the right to self-ownership, and (3) Rawls' theory is ahistorical. On the first principle (1), it can be pointed out that Kant argues that everyone should be treated as an end in themselves and never merely as a means to an end. Rawls violates this principle in terms of redistribution according to Nozick, as the talented in society are treated as a means to an end to support the weak in society. This critique could be defended by pointing out that the principle states that people should not only be used as a means to an end, but in society, people are typically treated to some extent as a means to an end. For example, it can be argued that bus drivers, carpenters, and doctors are all treated as a means to an end, but not only as a means, also as individuals in their own right. Similarly, the talented serve as a means to an end, but they are not solely that.
Nozick also criticizes (2) Rawls for violating the right to self-ownership. The reasoning is that redistribution, particularly in connection with the difference principle, may involve the infringement of an individual's right to self-ownership. From Nozick's philosophy, it can be argued that through redistribution, others gain rights to one's labor, including the time a person has used their body and hands, which violates the right to self-ownership according to Nozick. In defense of this critique, it could be pointed out that unconditional self-ownership does not necessarily always lead to the moral solution.
For example, redistributing economic goods could give others access to public education or healthcare, and some may argue that this is the moral solution despite others being taxed. The Lockean property rights thesis can also be critiqued: should a person have a right to property or resources by adding value to them? Nozick views taxation and redistribution not just as theft, but as slavery; this can be compared to what is normally considered real slavery: that people have no choice over their profession, residence, life plan, etc.
For example, people still have the freedom to become doctors, teachers, etc., and the social and economic opportunities provided through redistribution can even enable this for some people. The third critique (3) is that Rawls' theory is ahistorical. According to Nozick, redistributing is taking others' property. Rawls' theory only deals with who deserves redistribution. He argues that there is a "blind spot" since it must also be considered what people have the right to in relation to their own labor. Rawls thus considers who should receive benefits, for example, but not the justice for those who have produced according to Nozick.
In his later work, Rawls moves away from a metaphysical foundation, particularly Kantian references, and towards a political framework. He does not incorporate metaphysical elements from religion or philosophy. Rawls thus shifts away from his Kantian basis as seen previously. It can be said that everyone is born into a political system, and thus it can be described as coercion-based. Legitimacy and stability must be achieved through consensus among reasonable citizens. Here, unreasonable citizens would include racists or advocates of slavery. Additionally, the burdens of judgment and value pluralism must be accepted. No political system can rest on a comprehensive doctrine. A comprehensive doctrine includes views on what is considered valuable, ideals for personal development, and much more related to human actions and realization of life ideals. Instead, Rawls suggests that people can accept a just democratic political culture.
Value pluralism involves free societies creating pluralism, where different worldviews and lifestyles among citizens can coexist. The question, according to value pluralism, is how to ensure a common political community that guarantees justice and stability. This is a primary concern in Rawls' political liberalism. Additionally, the liberal legitimacy principle must be considered. As humans, we are born into a political community that can be described as coercion-based. For this coercive power to be justified, it must be governed by a legal order with principles ensuring that all free and equal citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse.
Rawls formulates fundamental principles for a democratic political culture as follows: All citizens are to be considered equal and free, there is an ambition to find fair terms for societal cooperation, it is assumed that everyone has the ability to pursue a conception of the good and to revise it. Finally, it is assumed that all citizens have the capacity to develop a sense of justice and act upon it. The original position in Rawls' theory can be seen as representing the principles of a democratic political culture. The original position generates conditions for equal citizens and promotes a just society. Therefore, the justice principles from "A Theory of Justice" can be understood in terms of the principles of a democratic political culture.
When discussing overlapping consensus, we are examining a common political foundation that is stable, just, and legitimate. According to Rawls' theory, citizens must accept a given content of "the right reasons." The right reasons are those that rest on the citizen’s own beliefs while achieving a consensus compatible with a context of conflicting doctrines. Overlapping consensus differs from a compromise. Consensus is considered a higher outcome than a compromise. A compromise does not necessarily meet the needs of the right citizen, making consensus preferable.
According to Rawls' theory, modus vivendi is viewed as more unstable compared to consensus. With Rawls' political liberalism, it can be argued that overlapping consensus can be reached across reasonable doctrines. This means that even if one person is a Christian, another is a utilitarian, and a third is a deontologist, these individuals should strive to find overlapping consensus. According to Rawls, overlapping consensus can be achieved through public reason, which sets requirements for administrators, judges, legislators, or citizens involved in exercising power within the state.
Public reason consists of principles of democratic political theory, common sense, and specific virtues such as tolerance and responsiveness, including the ability and willingness to provide public reasons. Public reasons are reasons that do not rely on religious doctrines or Kantian philosophy. They describe reasons that do not refer to comprehensive doctrines. This includes the proviso, which allows for non-public reasons to be used if they can later be replaced with public reasons. An example is Martin Luther King Jr.’s campaign for equality, which was initially based on religious doctrine—a non-public reason—that was later translated into public reasons.
In political theory, the "right" can be described as what is fair, impartial, and just, including examples such as the veil of ignorance. Additionally, it includes principles of justice, rights, and moral principles. In contrast, the "good" may encompass utility, although this does not automatically imply an adoption of a utilitarian position. The good can also include happiness and what is required for a good life. Communities and relationships can be highlighted in the pursuit of the good. A critique of this might be the question: what is really the good? Based on Rawls' political liberalism, it can be argued that the theory is grounded in a conception of the good life. The theory is not neutral concerning the ideal of autonomy. Rawls' theory is tied to an autonomy ideal that assumes individuals have an interest and the ability to formulate and revise their conception of the good.
The neutrality objection, presented by value pluralists such as Richard Bellamy, criticizes the idea that it is impossible to integrate all significant values into a tension-free whole. Therefore, it is argued that it is not possible to achieve overlapping consensus because there is tension or incommensurability between various values. Critics of Rawls argue that we must choose which values to pursue. Rawls' political liberalism and the idea of overlapping consensus are criticized as utopian. Bellamy proposes an alternative to overlapping consensus through value compromises. These compromises involve making moral concessions that attempt to balance incommensurable values. This process is characterized by respect, reciprocity, and sincerity. According to Bellamy’s theory, the result should be based on evenhandedness rather than neutrality among doctrines.
The exclusion objection argues that political liberalism’s conceptualization of public reason, including public reasons, restricts religious influence in politics, thereby excluding religious elements from political discourse. There is a perceived inequality between secular and religious citizens, as it might be burdensome for religious individuals to translate their doctrines into public reasons. It may also be the case that religious individuals are unable to translate theological arguments into public reasons. Chambers argues that political liberalism might de facto exclude religious citizens from participating in society and politics on an equal footing with secular citizens. There is also an integrity challenge, as religious citizens might be forced to split their identity between their "religious self" and their "political self." This results in a distinction between the public political persona and the private religious persona. Chambers argues that religious reasons should be included in political debate. According to Chambers, religious texts and leaders should not be considered infallible authorities. Religious reasons can also contribute to discussions on ethical and moral issues such as abortion or genetics. Chambers thus emphasizes the importance of how religious citizens argue and participate in the debate.
Cillian McBride offers a possible response to this objection. McBride argues that political reasons can be excluded to a limited extent; it is not entirely impossible to express religious views in the informal public sphere. Therefore, religious arguments should only be used in connection with the exercise of political power. It is also not clear that exclusion is inherently unjust. Regarding the integrity challenge, it can be argued that everyone has a "private self" and a "public self"; thus, religious people are not unique in having expectations about how to act as a public citizen. Political liberalism includes the idea that free institutions can lead to conflicting views but can still reach consensus on "the right" (principles of justice). The asymmetry objection points out that this consensus might cover only "the right" and not "the good."
Communitarians, such as Michael J. Sandel, argue that a common understanding of "the good" can be reached. Therefore, there is criticism that liberalism focuses heavily on "the right" without seeking overlapping consensus on "the good." It can be argued that there should be agreement on "the good" and that the state should also focus on promoting "the good" through legislation. According to Sandel, "the unencumbered self" can be described as a self that is independent of purposes and ends, with an identity beyond experience. Here, there is a prioritization of principles over teleological thinking (Sandel, 1984, p. 86). This self can be described as the unencumbered self, where the self is understood as something that exists independently of purposes and ends. This self thus has a core that is rational. Sandel criticizes the liberal thinking according to the idea of the unencumbered self, as people also shape their identities and worldviews based on communities. Therefore, it can also prove challenging to prioritize justice over other essential aspects of human life.
Sandel acknowledges that the idea of the unencumbered self is attractive because it offers a clear, autonomous notion of individuality. However, he argues this perspective is flawed because it ignores the inherent interconnectedness and contextual nature of human identity: "As I will try to argue now, what makes this [liberal] ethic so compelling, but also, finally, vulnerable, are the promise and the failure of the unencumbered self" (Sandel, 1984, p. 83). Sandel critiques the liberal focus on universal principles of justice that are supposed to be neutral regarding what constitutes a good life. He refers to Kant's and Rawls' views, highlighting that they prioritize abstract principles over concrete notions of the good, potentially disregarding the contextual and communal aspects of human existence: "The liberal ethic asserts the priority of right, and seeks principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. This is what Kant means by the supremacy of the moral law, and what Rawls means when he writes that 'justice is the first virtue of social institutions'" (Sandel, 1984, p. 83).
Sandel describes the liberal idea of the self as being fundamentally separate from any particular goals or purposes. The emphasis is on the ability to choose rather than the choices themselves. This suggests a kind of self that is free-standing and not shaped by its commitments or relationships: "This is the picture of the unencumbered self, a self understood as prior to and independent of purposes and ends [...] For the unencumbered self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose them" (Sandel, 1984, p. 86).
Sandel uses Rawls' concept of the original position to illustrate how liberal theory prioritizes principles of justice over specific conceptions of the good. In this view, the moral principles that govern society are chosen without regard to particular ends, emphasizing a form of justice that is detached from any specific vision of the good life: "The original position sums up this central claim about us. 'It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature,' writes Rawls, 'but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be formed ... We should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior'" (Sandel, 1984, p. 86).
Sandel argues that both Kant and Rawls advocate for a kind of self that is separate from its experiences and purposes. This detachment is seen as necessary for moral autonomy, allowing individuals to view themselves objectively and make unbiased decisions. However, Sandel criticizes this distance as unrealistic, suggesting it neglects the embedded and interdependent nature of real human lives: "We must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, whether as transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as unencumbered selves in the case of Rawls. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue" (Sandel, 1984, p. 87).
Sandel's critique underscores the importance of recognizing the situatedness of individuals within their social and historical contexts. Nonetheless, these liberal theories, while sometimes appearing overly detached, present an ideal that society might strive towards. Nozick himself critiques Rawls' theory, but he also formulates his own theory. Returning to Nozick's theory, it revolves around conditions for private property rights. According to Nozick, private property rights hinge on three essential conditions. First, just acquisition: a person is the rightful owner if the object is acquired in accordance with the principle of just acquisition. Second, just transfer: a person is the rightful owner if the object is acquired through a transfer that adheres to the principle of just transfer from a rightful owner. Therefore, a person cannot, for example, receive an object in connection with theft or fraud. Third, just rectification: a person is not entitled to anything that does not comply with the first and second principles (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 59).
Nozick's theory is non-patterned in that goods should not be distributed based on characteristics of individuals or redistributions. Patterned theories will always violate individual freedom according to Nozick. Therefore, Nozick's theory focuses on just acquisition, transfer, and rectification. The intuitive argument aims to describe a distribution of goods from a just starting point. According to Nozick, the distribution is just if we start from a just starting point and distribute justly concerning just acquisition, transfer, and rectification.
However, these conditions from Nozick can be critiqued from the standpoint that it is very rare for an object to meet all these conditions. In a complex industrial society, goods like mobile phones and other technological gadgets may contain a mineral that does not meet these conditions, and thus the person does not have a right to the given product. Additionally, historical remnants of intergenerational injustices, colonization, and the like can be pointed out; in this context, property rights and other ownerships that are rooted in historical injustices can be highlighted.
According to Nozick, society can be just regardless of the degree of inequality. Nonetheless, Nozick's principles can be criticized for being an unrealistic differentiation that fails to offer solutions to these injustices, perceived by others. Objections can thus be made to Nozick's intuitive argument, such as the voluntariness objection, which questions whether there actually is a free exchange, and the opportunity objection, which takes into account that people are born into unequal circumstances due to the social and genetic lottery.
Freedom, Capabilities and Functionings
The libertarian understanding of freedom is largely based on negative freedom, which involves freedom from interference by others. This contrasts with positive freedom, typically described as the freedom to a given set of opportunities (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 52-53). John Locke's labor theory, for instance, states that the work of one's body and the labor of one's hands are rightly one's own. Everything a person processes includes a part of themselves and is therefore considered their property. Libertarianism thus prioritizes individual freedom and typically seeks to minimize state or other interference in individuals' lives. Most libertarians adhere to the following theses:
Liberal freedom thesis: By nature, people are born equal and have the right to the highest degree of freedom that allows others the same degree of freedom.
Self-ownership thesis: Individuals possess an inviolable right to control themselves, including their own body and labor.
Lockean property rights thesis: Individuals have the right to external resources resulting from their labor, provided that others' property rights are not violated and sufficient common natural resources are left for others.
Minimal state thesis: The state's role is solely to secure individuals' freedom and property rights.
The political implications of libertarianism can include: Reduction of redistribution, rectification of historical injustices, no paternalistic legislation, and no "moral norms legislation". F.A. Hayek advocates for what can be termed classical or pure liberalism. According to economic science and political philosophy, Hayek argues for a minimal state based on the ideal of the free market. Hayek's position is founded on the idea that the free market creates a spontaneous order that arises independently of individuals and occurs without injustice (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 52). In this context, Hayek points out that any intervention aimed at redistributing economic goods violates individuals' freedom rights.
Positive freedom, on the other hand, requires the fulfillment of certain conditions, including economic, social, and psychological. Positive freedom denotes that an individual is free if and only if they are free to realize their true self and pursue their genuine interests. Isaiah Berlin criticizes positive freedom. In this context, the slippery slope argument can be highlighted, which includes the following:
The shared self implication: Criticism is raised that the concept of positive freedom assumes that a person has a rational (true) side versus an irrational (false) side.
The rational's better knowing: If freedom is understood as the realization of true interests, then "the rational" know better how to make "the irrational" free than the irrational themselves.
Paternalism: It follows from the second principle that "the rational" must decide for "the irrational" in the name of freedom. This can be termed as paternalism in the name of freedom.
Berlin concludes that the concept of positive freedom should be rejected based on the slippery slope argument. He raises concerns about the potential for tyranny in the name of the "true self" or "freedom," thereby ignoring the actual desires of individuals in society.
Introducing the triadic concept of freedom, questions about freedom often revolve around the relationship between an agent (X), a goal (Z), and a constraint (Y), a concept referred to as the triadic concept of freedom. Within this framework, a person can be considered both free and unfree in the same situation. This duality highlights freedom as a relationship involving an agent, a goal, and a constraint. Take, for example, Carter's case: an agent (X) might be free from others' interference (Y) to pursue an activity such as smoking (Z). Conversely, the same agent (X) might not be free due to their dependency (Y) on adhering to an agreement (Z). Gerald C. MacCallum Jr. argues that there is only one fundamental concept of freedom, under which both positive and negative freedoms should be viewed as possible interpretations. This perspective brings into question what counts as constraints or obstacles (Y). William E. Conolly expands on this by noting that even non-personified non-actions can serve as constraints. Berlin, however, critiques the triadic concept of freedom, asserting that all freedom is simultaneously positive and negative, or perhaps neither. He sees this as a flawed approach to understanding freedom. Berlin uses the example of a man who has been enslaved, emphasizing that the man's immediate goal must be to free himself from oppression.
According to Philip Pettit, republican freedom should be understood as freedom from domination, a concept that contrasts with negative freedom because it requires more than just freedom from interference by others. To grasp republican freedom, it is crucial to define what it means to have domination over another. Domination occurs when a dominator has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in the choices available to the dominated. Freedom from domination is fundamentally different from negative freedom. This distinction arises from two key points: first, domination can occur without interference, and second, interference can occur without domination. Thus, republican freedom emphasizes a deeper level of autonomy beyond merely being free from external obstacles.
Capability theory, on the other hand, is based on the idea that human life should be understood as pluralistic and complex. The measure of justice here is not welfare but rather the concept of capabilities. Capabilities can be described as substantial freedoms that can be either exercised or not. Individuals are considered free if they have the capabilities to become what they have strong reasons to value. Freedom as capabilities thus describes a person’s effective freedom to achieve valuable functionings. Functionings can include having a democratic vote, pursuing education, getting married, or being nourished. No one should force a fasting person to eat, but everyone should have access to be nourished. Capability is thus the effective freedom to achieve certain functionings. This freedom should not only be formal but also real, meaning a person should have access to other functionings. For example, freedom of speech might be formally guaranteed in a society, but to participate in societal debate effectively, people also need to be somewhat educated.
If we look at two different sets of functionings, where person A has the right to vote and person B does not, neither person A nor person B has achieved the functioning of voting, as we are not interested in f(A)=f(B), but rather in K(f(A))=K(f(B)). That is, both person A and person B, according to capability theory, should have effective freedom to vote. A person who is starving, compared to someone who is fasting, has the same type of functionings regarding nourishment, but they do not have the same capabilities according to Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory. The crucial difference here is that the person who is fasting has a choice not to fast, whereas the person who is starving does not have a choice. Substantive freedom can be understood as combined capabilities. That is, a combination of internal capabilities and social conditions, including economic and political, which ensure that the person can actually choose a given functioning. Capability theory can be explained as a positive concept of freedom. The reasons for this are: (1) Freedom is understood as an issue of effective access to valuable functionings, and (2) Freedom is not achieved merely by the absence of interference or coercion, such as from the state. According to capability theory, freedom is more comprehensive; it is not just the absence of coercion but involves access to effective opportunities for certain functionings.
Regarding which functionings people should have effective freedom to, Amartya Sen argues that human beings are complex and diverse, which means that a universal list of capabilities cannot be drawn up. Therefore, valuable capabilities must be defined through what is called public deliberation. Sen believes that reality is so complex and people can be so different that it does not make sense to propose a simplified solution or precision. On the question of which functionings people should have effective freedom to, Nussbaum argues that some capabilities are indeed more fundamental than others.
According to Nussbaum, there must be a consensus on the importance of certain capabilities, such as education. The ability to do something like standing on one’s head is not as important as other things, such as education and nourishment. Therefore, Nussbaum proposes a list of central capabilities that all people should at a minimum have access to, including: life, physical health, bodily integrity, senses and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, and other species.
On Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice
Luck egalitarianism can be described as a position that accepts unequal distributions as long as they reflect individual choices. On the other hand, unequal distributions that do not reflect an individual's choices are considered unjust. The fundamental idea is that unequal distributions are only fair if they result from one’s own choices, not from the circumstances to which one is subjected. However, discussions may arise about when a choice should be considered as exercised by the person themselves rather than being a result of circumstances, as well as what is the relevant unit in discussing equality—whether it pertains to resources or welfare.
Luck egalitarianism thus argues that a situation is fair if and only if people's social position reflects only the respective choices they have made and for which they can be held responsible. It can be explained as a theory of distributive justice in society, and therefore does not constitute a comprehensive theory of society. Instead, this theory attempts to assess the distribution of society's goods based on what people can be held responsible for. A situation is therefore fair if and only if how well-off people are solely reflects their respective choices, which they can reasonably be held accountable for (Lippert-Rasmussen et al., 2020, p. 71).
The challenge with luck egalitarianism is to investigate whether it is possible to create a theory of justice that compensates for arbitrary life conditions more than John Rawls, while still respecting people's freedom as articulated by Robert Nozick. Elizabeth Anderson’s objection to luck egalitarianism states that if this luck egalitarianism is sustainable, it is fair to refuse help for a self-inflicted problem, such as a drunk driver who has caused their own injuries. However, it is not fair to refuse help to the injured, according to Anderson. Therefore, Anderson does not see luck egalitarianism as sustainable.
Rawls formulates in his thinking an idea about a natural and a social lottery. Factors involved here are morally arbitrary, which luck egalitarians also recognize as being the case. In this context, Rawls devises the veil of ignorance. Luck egalitarians could have objections related to the criticism of responsibility and the incentive criticism. The responsibility criticism questions whether people are truly responsible for being the worst off, thus addressing something morally non-arbitrary. The incentive criticism might highlight that it does not make sense to tolerate the difference principle that rewards the talented, who possess advantageous traits from birth, thus addressing something morally arbitrary. Nozick focuses on the principles of rightful transfer and acquisition and argues that as long as individuals have rightfully acquired their property or similar, it is a fair distribution. Therefore, distributions should not follow a predetermined pattern but reflect people's activities and their rightful acquisition of property. Luck egalitarianism, however, could argue that this theory is based on rewarding people for something other than their own choices. There is a reward based on innate social and natural conditions, which is problematic according to luck egalitarian thinking, as the outcomes people experience should be a product of their respective choices.
Outcome egalitarianism, on the other hand, prescribes that a situation can be described as fair if and only if everyone is equally well off. Outcome egalitarianism should therefore not be confused with luck egalitarianism. If outcome equality is required, it is sought that the distribution has an equal outcome, even if people have made different choices. According to libertarianism and luck egalitarianism, this can be described as an unfair distribution since the distribution is influenced by individual choices and actions. Ronald Dworkin's discussion takes its starting point in outcome equality with quality of life as the focal point. This position prescribes that a situation is fair if and only if everyone has the same quality of life. In this understanding, quality of life should not be equated with income, though it is recognized that income influences quality of life.
However, some problematic implications arise when considering: (a) people with offensive preferences, (b) people with expensive preferences, and (c) people with cheap preferences. For example, person A might experience significant well-being by buying a cheap wine from the supermarket, whereas person B does not experience the same well-being with the cheap wine because he prefers rare and expensive wines. Thus, there is a situation where there is an equal distribution of resources, both person A and B get the cheap wine from the supermarket, but person B does not experience the same level of welfare due to his expensive preferences. Here, Dworkin can be reintroduced, as it is precisely Dworkin's point that it is not reasonable to redistribute just so person B with the expensive preferences can be as satisfied as person A and other people. Based on this reasoning, Dworkin argues that welfare equality must be rejected; it therefore does not make sense to strive for equal welfare for all people.
In light of Dworkin's critique of welfare equality, it can be asked what kind of equality should then be pursued? To answer this question, Dworkin formulates his resource equality. To explain this position, a thought experiment can be undertaken. Imagine that a group of castaways lands on a deserted island where everyone is given the same number of seashells. On the island, everything is sold via an auction, where the conditions are: everyone must participate equally, no prior inequalities, and it is assumed that everyone is initially equally talented. The result of the auction is deemed satisfactory only when no one would want another person's set of goods; this is called the envy test. Thus, according to this thought experiment, the auction must be repeated until there is no envy among the participants.
The basic idea behind the auction is that people pay what others would pay for the resources on the auction market. Thus, a valuation set by the market occurs. The envy test is not just about the final outcome, but also the willingness among the participants to obtain a given good. The theory can also be described as ambition-sensitive. The rationale is that it allows people to have different ambitions and make different choices. A theory is ambition-sensitive if and only if people can make different choices and ambitions, and thus end up being differently situated as a reflection of unique ambitions and choices. Another significant point behind Dworkin's theory of resource equality lies in the distinction between brute luck and option luck. Option luck can be described as the luck that arises from taking chances oneself. Whether the person wins or loses something from this bet, there is an isolated risk that the person has chosen to take.
Brute luck, on the other hand, describes how risk is not a product of self-exercised betting. The distinction between brute luck and option luck offers an excellent understanding of which inequalities can be considered problematic and which outcomes can be accepted. Although it is not a perfect guide, the distinction helps think about what is due to the person's own actions (option luck) and what is beyond the person's control (brute luck). Admittedly, this theoretical distinction can be criticized for not being nuanced enough in its understanding of the complexity of the world and human life in general. The thought experiment with the auction is an attempt to ensure that inequalities are a product of option luck rather than brute luck.
Dworkin also introduces the idea of a hypothetical insurance market; a scenario where it is thought about what people would insure themselves against under ideal circumstances. Dworkin rejects the idea that people would fully insure against all diseases or in case they do not achieve the highest income. This would be irrational, according to Dworkin, as the price would be too high, including a concern about what could be termed "the slavery of the talented." In light of these arguments, Dworkin's theory cannot be thought of as completely talent-insensitive. For a theory to be talent-insensitive, it must ensure that people are not differently situated due to varying luck, such as innate talents.
Overall, Dworkin criticizes welfare equality and prefers resource equality, focusing on external goods (auction) and internal goods (hypothetical insurance scheme). Dworkin's thesis states that if resources are distributed according to the two presented models, the mechanisms involved in the auction and the hypothetical insurance scheme, the distribution is ambition-sensitive and approximately talent-insensitive. Imagine a man in a wheelchair. Both Dworkin and G.A. Cohen and Richard Arneson would argue that the man should be compensated for his disability. Cohen would point out that if this man, the wheelchair user, experiences pain in his arms, it is not because he is worse at using them than others. However, the pain he experiences may reflect unequal welfare, though not unequal resources. This raises the question of whether only resources should be considered. Both Arneson and Cohen assert that welfare (also) counts. Cohen’s ideal is that there should be equal access to advantages. Cohen agrees with Arneson that the concept of resources is narrow, but he feels the same about the concept of welfare. Therefore, Cohen introduces the idea of "advantages," a concept that encompasses both welfare and resources. In this sense, opportunities are seen as external circumstances, making access a crucial consideration.
Based on luck egalitarianism, it can be argued that Dworkin advocates for equal opportunities with respect to resources, while Arneson argues for equal opportunities concerning welfare, and Cohen emphasizes the importance of equal access to advantages. Thus, three different luck egalitarian theories emerge, all of which are responsibility-sensitive but differ on key issues related to resources, welfare, and advantages. For Dworkin, there is a significant distinction between personal characteristics and circumstances, where personal traits (e.g., preferences) must be borne by the individual themselves. In contrast, Cohen and Arneson draw a distinction between what is chosen and what is not chosen. In this context, aspects of what Dworkin categorizes as personal traits might be seen as unchosen. According to Cohen and Arneson, a significant point is that compensation should be made for the unchosen, such as unchosen costly preferences.
Various criticisms of luck egalitarianism exist. One such critique is the determinism objection, which questions whether a clear distinction can be drawn between chosen and unchosen elements. It suggests that what is considered unchosen might already be predetermined. Some argue that compensating for lack of luck might be seen as disrespectful. The disrespect critique concerns the notion that systematically addressing a situation where some contribute so little—such as in terms of market value—that others are forced to share their resources, might be considered disrespectful or patronizing. The indeterminacy critique questions whether luck egalitarianism can offer significant insights. It might be problematic that there is uncertainty about issues related to responsibility and proportionality. It can be challenging to assess what results from individuals' own actions, but a luck egalitarian would likely argue that it is still important to articulate ideas about which distributions are considered fair.
Anderson highlights the discrepancy objection in her critique of luck egalitarianism. She argues that luck egalitarianism places too much emphasis on choice. There is also a challenge in the notion that a situation does not necessarily need to be insensitive to abilities to be just. Anderson contends that a situation can be described as sensitivity to ambitions while still being unjust. For example, negligent victims are left to their own fate. Luck egalitarianism can also compel the state to discriminate against people who are disabled due to their own choices, such as through negligence, while people with disabilities due to congenital issues might still receive support. This objection also raises concerns about potential geographic or occupational discrimination and the vulnerability of caregivers in a luck egalitarian society. For example, caregivers such as mothers or fathers who take care of children are crucial for the economy and society to function. These caregivers may be extremely vulnerable but are necessary for overall societal functioning. Anderson finds it problematic that, according to luck egalitarianism, society is viewed as an atomic unit, where everyone lives on their own island. Instead, Anderson believes society should be viewed as a whole in relation to one another.
Luck egalitarians might counter that individuals are responsible for insuring themselves against misfortune. However, this is problematic because not everyone can or should insure themselves against every unfortunate outcome in life. Anderson also argues that the state, from a luck egalitarian perspective, is forced to be disrespectful and intrusive in its assessments of whether citizens have ended up in a bad situation due to their own freedom or not. Anderson points out that it is peculiar for the state to judge whether people are talented or born with certain characteristics that have placed them in a worse position in life. Furthermore, Anderson notes that luck egalitarianism in a society could encourage citizens to shirk responsibility by claiming, "Look how untalented I am," and thus receive compensation. It can also be stigmatizing, according to Anderson, to categorize who has "deficient" qualities. The distribution objection highlights challenges such as whether justice can be realized in a non-social state, as illustrated by the luck egalitarianism’s island example.
The explanation objection points to the explanation of distribution patterns. For example, it could be argued that there should be a distribution ensuring that everyone has enough. The political implications of luck egalitarianism can be extensive, as the theoretical approach to justice can address issues such as health, inequality, and markets. For example, one might question whether it is fair for those who do not make the best choices for their own health to be included in a healthcare system on equal terms with others. From this example, issues may arise regarding when something is a result of personal action and whether a distribution should be considered in terms of resources versus welfare.
Anderson criticizes luck egalitarianism for its excessive focus on choice and distributions, instead of considering relationships. She outlines a form of relational egalitarianism ("democratic equality"). The free market is about trade and distribution of goods through people’s free choices, whereas the welfare state distributes goods that are beyond individual control. Anderson argues that we end up with the worst aspects of both capitalism and the welfare state. Based on what is termed "starting-gate theory," it can be argued that there is an inadequate safety net. There is also a problem concerning the state's assessment of who deserves a poor position and who does not. Luck egalitarianism subscribes to a distributive ideal of justice, where a distribution is considered just if it is the result of people's own responsibility and choices. The relational justice ideal, on the other hand, holds that a situation is just if individuals are socially related and interact with each other in a particular manner. The relational approach focuses on relationships rather than solely on distributions, but distributions are important in the sense that they can affect the relationships between citizens.
Relational egalitarianism criticizes luck egalitarianism for its predominant focus on luck and individual choices, and the political implications of this focus, which may result in a less secure safety net. Luck egalitarianism describes a situation as just only if the distribution in society reflects choices made by individuals themselves. Thus, according to luck egalitarianism, there can be justifiable inequality if the differences are a product of people's own responsibility and choices. Further, the reductionism challenge is a critique pointing out that many of the injustices that relational egalitarianism focuses on can be reduced to distributive injustices. The pluralism challenge critiques relational egalitarianism by arguing that it is not necessarily evident that the relational ideal of justice should replace the distributive ideal of justice.
The opportunity challenge is an interesting critique of relational egalitarianism that points out that relational egalitarianism rejects the ideal of equality of opportunity. Relational egalitarianism concerns itself only with equality if all are treated as equals in the democratic society in relation to one another. The incompleteness challenge criticizes relational egalitarianism by highlighting that there are examples of injustices between individuals who do not engage in social relations. For example, it could point to global inequalities, such as how Western countries might exploit other countries through military intervention or resource extraction.
Relational egalitarianism considers a situation just only if individuals within it are socially related and interact as equals. Within relational egalitarianism, there are particularly two central thinkers: Anderson’s relational egalitarianism ("democratic equality") and Samuel Scheffler’s relational egalitarianism ("egalitarian deliberative restriction"). The negative goal of relational egalitarianism is to eliminate social oppression, while the positive goal is to create a community where everyone is treated as an equal. According to Anderson, democratic equality involves viewing two people as equals and accepting that they must be able to justify their actions to one another. In other words, there should be mutual consultation and recognition among participants in a democratic society. A society is considered just by Anderson when certain conditions are met: (1) citizens must not be subjected to social disrespect, (2) problematic social hierarchies must not exist, and (3) citizens must have sufficient resources to participate equally in societal activities. This means that all citizens are obligated to ensure the social conditions for everyone’s freedom. Anderson’s relational egalitarianism (democratic equality) proposes a more comprehensive (positive) conception of freedom compared to some schools of libertarianism. Amartya Sen’s capability approach describes functionings as states constitutive of people’s well-being or autonomy. A person’s capabilities are therefore not outcomes but choices they have; it refers to the functionings they have effective access to.
In the context of Anderson’s theory, the focus is on ensuring capabilities, not functionings. For instance, people might choose not to pursue an education or vote, but they must have the option to do so. Anderson accepts inequality but emphasizes that everyone must have access to participate in society on equal terms. Anderson’s theory cannot be described as a starting-gate theory, as one can never give up or lose their capabilities. The society must ensure all citizens' right to health, but citizens themselves can opt out of this service without losing their capability. Capabilities are not just resources but can also include the possibility of publicly expressing one’s sexual preferences.
Impartial individual equality entails that all people have intrinsic value and are equal to one another. Utilitarianism argues that we should seek to maximize utility for everyone, or the so-called sum of welfare. This utilitarian approach denies that equality has intrinsic value. Utilitarians also borrow a concept from economics: diminishing marginal utility. Utilitarians use this concept to argue that for each unit of a resource, and as people's conditions improve, less utility is gained from that additional unit of a given resource. Research suggests that equality can enhance welfare, and based on this reasoning, utilitarians can argue for the necessity of equality. The principle of equality asserts that it is inherently unjust if some people are worse off than others.
The equality principle can be criticized on the grounds that achieving equality may not always be desirable. For example, if there is a population of 1000 people, of whom 100 are poor, making the remaining 900 poor does not necessarily improve the situation. However, this criticism can be defended by pointing out that progress is not an improvement if it is worse for some and better for no one. Egalitarians might argue that leveling down to the lowest common denominator has no value in achieving justice. The leveling down objection argues that equality is problematic in the sense that it can lead to everyone being brought down to the same level. It is not desirable to pull a group down just so that everyone can be equal according to the levelling down objection. Just because there are blind people in society does not mean, for example, that everyone else should also become blind. Therefore, the equality principle can also be explained as a conditional equality principle, where equality is not desirable if it is Pareto-inefficient.
The deprivation objection further argues that an exclusive focus on equality, including relative positions, can divert attention from what is truly important: that some people have too little in an absolute sense. Paula Casal highlights the "allegiance objection," which criticizes the principle of equality for placing a significant burden on individuals, making it difficult for them to willingly adhere to the principle. Casal also formulates the shortage objection, which argues that attempting to achieve equality can lead to a situation where more people than necessary receive insufficient resources. For example, if there are 10 critically ill patients in a hospital but only enough medication for five, it would not make sense, in the name of "equality," to let everyone die. This objection can be countered by arguing that equality is not about destroying resources or achieving the worst possible outcomes, but ensuring that everyone has a fair chance of survival, such as through lottery allocation of medication.
However, the solution to this objection depends on the specific school of thought. One could also take into account factors such as age, disease progression, and other considerations. Further, the non-identity problem can be described as a philosophical issue concerning the fact that the identity of future generations will differ. For example, according to Larry Temkin, we might adopt a "live in the present" policy (e.g., consuming fossil fuels extensively) or a "care for the future" policy (e.g., focusing on sustainable solutions). Thus, there could be a situation where a slight detriment to the present is justified to produce a better future. It can be argued that engaging in a "care for the future" policy is preferable to, for example, spending all resources in the present.
The priority principle states that it is valuable to benefit people, and it is more valuable to benefit those who are worse off. This principle can be described as an aggregative (non-comparative) principle. The absolute priority principle asserts that the worst-off should be given absolute priority compared to those who are better off. The weighted priority principle can be related to utilitarianism to some extent, where there is diminishing marginal utility; for each unit of a resource, the better off people are, the less utility is gained from an additional unit of that resource. Roger Crisp criticizes the priority principle. He does this, among other ways, with a thought experiment. Intuition suggests that instead of giving chocolate to the rich, focus should be on alleviating pain. However, it can be pointed out that comparing chocolate (a trivial good) with pain relief is an absurd comparison.
On the other hand, the quantitative priority principle holds that it is more important to benefit people according to their level of disadvantage. The more disadvantaged individuals who can be helped, the better. The number of those who are helped begins to matter less as the people are better off. The Beverly Hills objection argues that if we, for instance, have to choose between giving Lafite (wine) to the wealthy or Latour (wine) to the super-wealthy, according to the quantitative priority principle, the wealthy should be prioritized over the super-wealthy. However, the question arises: is it even relevant to consider the prioritization between the wealthy and the super-wealthy? When we are at a certain level of wealth, it can be argued that it is not significant to prioritize the worse-off over those who are better off. Casal points out that the Beverly Hills objection is not relevant when the examples are so far-fetched.
Many argue that it is essential for us to be equal, for example, equality in health. The sufficiency doctrine argues that it is not necessarily important for everyone to be equal, but instead, that everyone has sufficient means or access to treatment. According to this doctrine, sufficiency is about ensuring that everyone has enough, but not that everyone must be completely equal, for example. The sufficiency principle can be formulated as follows: a distribution is just when everyone has enough of the relevant good. Here, sufficientarianism can be introduced, which assumes the following claims:
The positive claim: A distribution is just if it ensures everyone is above a certain threshold.
The negative claim: It is sufficient for a distribution to be just if everyone is above the relevant threshold.
Above this threshold, obligations of justice cease. The threshold for sufficiency can be described as a kind of boundary value where an impartial observer would agree that the person should be helped. However, it is difficult to determine precisely how the threshold should be set. Crisp's sufficiency principle (also known as the "mercy principle") includes: 1) absolute priority to people below the threshold, 2) weighted priority up to the threshold, and 3) no priority above the threshold. Mercy should be shown to those who are below the threshold.
However, the indifference objection raises criticism of sufficiency. Imagine that all patients in a hospital have received sufficient medicine, food, and treatment to meet the threshold according to the sufficiency principle. If the hospital then receives a donation to build cinemas and buy massage chairs for some patients, the indifference objection points out that the sufficiency principle becomes indifferent to how additional goods are distributed among patients once everyone is above the threshold.
Defining and Differentiating Discrimination
Generic discrimination entails that X discriminates against Y in relation to Z if and only if X treats Y worse than Z. Generic discrimination implies a negative differential treatment. Whereas irrelevance discrimination means X discriminates against Y in relation to Z if and only if 1) X treats Y worse than Z, and 2) X does this for reasons that are irrelevant to how Y should be treated in relation to Z. An example is when men and women receive different wages for the same work.
Legal discrimination, on the other hand, means "X discriminates against Y in relation to Z if and only if 1) X treats Y worse than Z, and 2) 1) is against the law." For discrimination to be considered legal, a person must not only be treated worse but the action must also be illegal. The problem with this argument is that the law does not necessarily dictate morality; for example, there have been laws against homosexuality.
The moralized concept of discrimination means X discriminates against Y in relation to Z if and only if 1) X treats Y worse than Z, and 2) it is unjust for X to treat Y worse than Z. Here, discrimination is understood as inherently unjust. A weakness of this approach is that it can be difficult to judge when discrimination occurs and whether it is unjust. For example, organ donation in healthcare might discriminate against older patients in favor of younger ones.
Group discrimination involves X discriminates against Y in relation to Z if and only if 1) X treats Y worse than Z, and 2) this is because Y belongs to a different socially prominent group than Z. Group discrimination is often studied or discussed in modern political discourse. This can include discrimination based on religion, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, and more. Some might also argue social class.
Direct discrimination occurs on an explicit basis. An example of direct discrimination is signage such as "we do not serve Roma people" at a bar. Indirect discrimination can be exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court case Griggs v. Duke Power (1971). The requirement for promotion was a high school diploma and tests, and it was argued that African American employees had significantly lower chances of promotion. The argument here is that a rule indirectly affects African Americans, even if there is no explicit basis for discrimination, and not necessarily any underlying intention, but the consequences are decisive.
Indirect discrimination can be defined as: X discriminates indirectly against Y in relation to Z if and only if 1) X treats Y worse than Z, and 2) this is because Y belongs to a different socially prominent group than Z, 3) but not in a way where the explanation is that X intends to treat Y worse than Z, and 4) the worse treatment is not proportional to the benefits achieved by the discriminatory practice.
Sophia Moreau believes that direct and indirect discrimination can be described as different on the surface. Benjamin Eidelson, however, argues that describing indirect discrimination as discrimination presents a problem in clearly communicating about discrimination. Eidelson argues that discrimination should be understood as an action where an agent is sensitive to a particular trait that the discriminated person has, leading to differential treatment. In the Southern United States, for example, literacy requirements for voting were imposed. This rule affected many African Americans. The rule was formulated "neutrally," but there was no doubt about its purpose in discriminating against a specific group. Likewise, the ban on masking in Denmark, although framed as a neutral rule, appears to be motivated by an intent to impact specific individuals within a particular religious group, such as Muslims.
Not only can we speak of discrimination, but also requirements. The accommodation requirement, for instance, necessitates that it is not sufficient to refrain from treating someone worse; it is necessary to accommodate others, such as people with disabilities. This is known as the accommodation requirement. There are also many added layers to discrimination in praxis. As an example, economic theory or statistics can be instrumentalized to discriminate when there is a lack of information, but if one has information about a social group, decisions can be made based on that.
Mortgage institutions in the USA, for instance, have discriminated against African Americans, arguing that statistically as a group, they are less likely to repay their loans compared to other populations. This statistical discrimination can be said to unfairly discriminate against African American homebuyers, as quantitative datasets are instrumentalized to discriminate against people on an individual level. Statistical discrimination can be defined as: X engages in statistical discrimination against Y with respect to Z if and only if 1) X treats Y worse than Z, and 2) this is because Y belongs to a socially prominent group different from Z, and 3) the basis for 1) is X's statistical assumption that members of Y's group statistically differ in a relevant way from members of Z. Non-statistical discrimination can, on the other hand, involve discrimination without any statistical basis. For example, a person may simply choose to discriminate against people from China based on "personal taste" or beliefs.
But what makes discrimination unfair? The absence of control argument states that discrimination is unfair because and only because discrimination involves negative differential treatment based on characteristics that the discriminated person has no control over. The opportunity inequality argument states that discrimination is unfair because and only because discrimination increases inequality of opportunity between different individuals. The disrespect argument states that discrimination is unfair because and only because discrimination expresses disrespect towards the discriminated party. Moreau presents two goals: to explain what discrimination is and why it is wrong, and to give meaning to anti-discrimination legislation, explaining why anti-discrimination laws in the English-speaking world are as they are. The law provides insight into "institutionalized collective ethics." Moreau's basic idea is that when looking at the law, discrimination is treated as if the discriminator harms the discriminated person. However, Moreau points out that the legal perspective does not really address structural problems and questions of redistribution concerning discrimination. Instead, there is a strong focus on harm between two parties: the discriminator and the discriminated. Moreau defines deliberative freedom as freedoms to have our decisions about how to live insulated from the effects of normatively extraneous features of us, such as our skin color or gender.
For example, a woman in a sexist culture may find her opportunities to get a managerial position diminished because she is a woman. Conversely, a man may be affected by whether he wants to take a caregiving job in a sexist culture. Deliberative freedom can be restricted by 1) changing a person's assumptions about whether they can make a given choice, and 2) regardless of what the person believes, they actually cannot achieve a given opportunity that is available to others. Thus, not all citizens have deliberative freedom, but Moreau argues that the law should "step in" and ensure that all citizens have deliberative freedom.
Moreau formulates it as follows: In order for to have a particular deliberative freedom with respect to a certain decision, it has to be true (1) not just that I believe I can make that decision without having to worry about pressures from a certain extraneous trait, (2) but that I really am free from those pressures. It is not enough for a woman to believe that she can get a managerial position with the same opportunities as men. It must be a real social reality that the person has this deliberative freedom. However, Moreau does not have a systematic answer to which groups should be protected and why. It can also be difficult to say when discrimination occurs based on traits, and this requires a "case-by-case assessment."
Not all restrictions on deliberative freedom are discrimination. For example, Moreau would argue that autonomy to choose one’s relationships is relevant. Thus, the law should not interfere with who people choose to be friends with, as this comes at the expense of the ability to form meaningful relationships. According to Moreau's logic, it could also be argued that it is not discrimination if a family invests more money in the daughter's education versus the son’s. This is a controversial position for many, but Moreau would argue that the state should not interfere in these private matters. It is also not necessarily relevant for a Catholic charity to include everyone in their organization; here, there is a purpose-driven exclusion.
A Brief Note on Gender, Justice and Feminism
An important domain when speaking of inequality, discrimination, and rights, is feminism. But what exactly is feminism? This is a broad question, and different theorists have different answers. For example, Susan Moller Okin describes feminism as the belief that women should not be disadvantaged due to their biological sex, and therefore, they should be seen as equal to men. This means that their life plans should be able to be carried out in the same way as a man's in a free society.
Feminism can be described as a critical position, claiming that patriarchal societal structures are based on a constructed distinction regarding gender and gender roles (the gender constructivism thesis). As a result of these social structures, there are strong normative reasons to challenge the status quo (the activism thesis). Amia Srinivasan describes feminism as not a philosophy, theory, or specific viewpoint. Instead, according to Srinivasan, feminism is a political movement aimed at transforming the world. There is a focus on how women's political, social, sexual, economic, and psychological subordination can be combated. According to her, the answer to this political project is not yet known, but it is something feminists must experiment with.
Feminism has evolved through four distinct waves throughout history. The First Wave, emerging in the early 1900s, primarily focused on securing equal political rights for women, such as the right to vote. The Second Wave, which began in the 1960s, expanded its agenda to address equal opportunities in various areas, including the workplace and education, while also advocating for sexual liberation. The Third Wave, starting in the 1990s, sought to challenge and deconstruct traditional notions of gender and sexual identity. This wave included diverse perspectives such as difference feminism, which highlighted the unique experiences of women; unity feminism, which aimed to find common ground among women; and radical postmodern feminism, which questioned and aimed to dismantle conventional categories of gender. Today, the Fourth Wave focuses on empowering women to define their own identities without facing social stigmatization or prejudice, and may also be said to increasingly draw on elements of queer theory.
Despite various definitions of feminism, it can be argued that Srinivasan's understanding of feminism as a political movement aimed at transforming the world implies that everyone should have equal opportunities, meaning women should not be subordinate. When discussing feminism, we can also relate it to unfair subordination according to Sophia Moreau, where, for example, women should not be subjected to gender-specific dress codes (such as in a restaurant). This can mark women as sex objects with less autonomy compared to men. Consequently, women end up appearing inferior, which is problematic.
The gender-recognizing approach acknowledges the biological distinction between men and women and, within this context, critiques societal structures and institutions based on gender roles rather than biological differences. An example of a gender-recognizing approach could be criticizing the idea that "women should not be educated." Here, the female biological sex is acknowledged, but certain ideas about what a woman should be according to societal structures and gender roles are criticized.
While the gender-recognizing approach acknowledges the biological distinction between men and women and critiques gender roles and societal structures, the gender-critical approach questions the very biological distinction between men and women. The binary distinction between men and women is, therefore, questionable in itself according to the gender-critical approach.
The Moral Dilemmas of Paternalistic Interventions
Paternalism can be broadly understood as a set of actions or policies designed to protect individuals from their own choices. These paternalistic measures often involve restricting people's freedoms through incentives or coercion. Such policies frequently oppose the individuals' own desires or will, as they may wish to be free from certain regulations or interventions.
The underlying rationale behind these actions is the belief that they are ultimately for the greater good or well-being of the people they affect. In essence, paternalistic policies aim to limit personal autonomy with the intention of promoting a perceived greater benefit for the individual or society. Thus, paternalism can be described as something aimed at protecting or creating incentives for people's own good, but which is not necessarily desired by the population itself. Gerald Dworkin’s (re)formulation of paternalism revolves around the idea that X can be considered paternalistic towards Y by doing Z if:
Z (or the omission thereof) overrides Y’s autonomy and freedom.
X does Z without Y’s consent.
X does something because Z will likely improve Y’s welfare (or prevent Y’s welfare from deteriorating) or takes care of Y’s interests, values, or good.
However, Dworkin's definition of paternalism is criticized. For example, an action can be paternalistic without infringing on a person's freedom or autonomy. Another theorist, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, argues contrary to Dworkin that an action can still be paternalistic even if it does not aim to benefit others. This argument by Shiffrin challenges both Dworkin's paternalism and the standard definition of paternalism.
In the discussion paternalism, hereunder nudging, an interesting question arises: does nudging violate people's autonomy and consent? It could be argued that nudging can lead to decision-making deficiencies, causing the person to partially lose control over their own autonomy and choices, which occur without consent. In such a situation, Richard H. Thaler Cass R. Sunstein would point out that choices always occur within a context. It is simply not possible for people to make decisions in a vacuum. Here, it can be highlighted whether the choice context supports reasonable choices or leads to arbitrary ones. It could be thought that people could be nudged to live healthier lives, where nudging that supports reasonable choices might be better than a random choice architecture. However, it is difficult to define what a reasonable choice is and who knows it best. Nudges can also vary. Some types of nudges are very transparent to others. Furthermore, nudges can target different psychological processes or even be compatible with consent. For example, if a person consents to being nudged towards a healthier lifestyle.
Shiffrin argues that the core of paternalism is not autonomy violation or lack of consent. Instead, paternalism prioritizes the action over what the person themselves thinks they should do. Paternalism is thus motivated by an approach where one's judgment overrides the person's own judgment. Shiffrin defines paternalism as an action performed by A towards B characterized by:
An intention to influence (or avoid influencing) B’s legitimate decision-making space.
A’s judgment and decision-making replace B’s.
The action is directed towards B’s own affairs or interests, which are matters B legitimately controls.
The basis for the action is that A sees their judgment and decision-making as superior to B’s.
When discussing paternalism, criticism often arises in connection with various theories. For example, Anderson criticizes luck egalitarians for the idea that protection against "option luck" is only possible if paternalism is involved. On the other hand, Berlin formulates a critique highlighting the slippery slope argument against positive freedom. That is, the understanding of positive freedom by those in power in a given society will lead to paternalism, and thus positive freedom must be rejected. Moreover, John Stuart Mill's harm principle involves yet another critique of paternalism. Here, Mill argues that power can only legitimately be used against a person's will if it is to prevent harm to others. Mill believes that freedom itself has intrinsic value. Only if a person harms others is there a legitimate reason to restrict a person's freedom. Self-harm cannot justify restrictions according to Mill. The anti-paternalist principle thus posits that it does not make sense to intervene in others' freedom, even if the intervention is thought to promote the person's welfare and interests.
"Pro tanto" is Latin for "to that extent" or "as far as it goes," and often refers to a partial satisfaction of a debt or claim in the legal world. However, within political theory, pro tanto reasons can be described as a contributing reason to do X, even though—considering everything—one may not necessarily have to do X. Pro tanto reasons can therefore be described as reasons that can also be outweighed or overridden by other reasons. For example, preventing an individual from self-harm might not be a pro tanto reason to restrict a person's freedom according to the anti-paternalist principle. That principle would not accept paternalistic reasons to limit freedom. Opponents of the anti-paternalist principle, however, would argue that preventing a person from self-harm can be a pro tanto reason to restrict their freedom. At the same time, there can also be pro tanto reasons to avoid this intervention, for example, that the value of autonomy also weighs in the decision-making process.
Joel Feinberg's anti-paternalist principle articulates a soft and hard paternalism. Soft paternalism can be defined as a form of paternalism where the state has the right to prevent self-harm if it involves involuntary actions. Additionally, the state can undertake a temporary intervention to investigate whether the action is voluntary or not. Hard paternalism argues that it is always relevant to intervene in a person's freedom when the intervention is thought to improve the individual's interests or welfare. If we consider the example of a person engaging in self-harm, soft paternalism would argue that sufficient involuntary aspects of the harm provide a pro tanto reason to intervene. However, voluntary self-harm is not considered a pro tanto reason to intervene. Hard paternalism, on the other hand, would argue that regardless of the degree of voluntariness, the prevention of self-harm must be a pro tanto reason.
Assuredly, there are many different critiques of paternalism. The autonomy objection, for instance, criticizes paternalism for interfering with individuals' legitimate sphere of action. However, this objection could be challenged by arguing that autonomy does not necessarily need to take precedence over welfare. The 'best judge' argument, on the other hand, highlights the point that individuals know best themselves. That is, a person has the best ability to assess their own interests and welfare. Thus, paternalism does more harm than good because other people lack the prerequisites to make decisions on others' behalf. Paternalism can also be criticized for expressing disrespect or creating unequal relations, as it involves a relatively negative view of other people's judgment. If an agent acts paternalistically, it appears as though they see themselves as superior in a given area. Relational egalitarians like Elizabeth Anderson can be characterized as opponents of paternalism. The reasoning is that the state does not consider citizens as moral equals—paternalism expresses disrespect and creates unequal relations. In this context, Højlund attempts to investigate whether this claim is correct; that paternalism is an expression of disrespect and unequal relations.
However, when discussing paternalism, there are also arguments in favor of this approach. For example, rational individuals may recognize that not all decisions made are rational. That is, people must acknowledge that they can sometimes act irrationally. The contract argument can be defended with a hypothetical choice situation that accounts for humans' irrational tendencies and thereby accepts certain paternalistic actions. However, it must also be acknowledged that lawmakers can act irrationally. In light of this issue, legislation intending to impose paternalistic restrictions must (1) bear a heavy burden of proof to establish that the legislation truly benefits the population, and (2) employ the least intrusive method to achieve the given goal of promoting welfare. Further, the consequentialist argument defends paternalism by pointing out that the benefits of preventing self-harm can be so significant that the advantages constitute a pro tanto reason. For example, mandatory seat belts in cars, from a consequentialist perspective, can be seen as a paternalistic action taken in light of the benefits it brings.
Sometimes, the benefits may outweigh the drawbacks of a paternalistic action. In addition, the reconciliation strategy argues that paternalistic policies can also have non-paternalistic rationales. For instance, a paternalistic policy could be implemented with regard to the burden on the healthcare system or to protect the economy. Paternalistic policies may thus be accepted by some without actually referring to paternalistic justifications.
Who Governs Whom?—The Meta-Order of Democratic Decision-Making
Modern democratic skepticism can today be observed among religious movements such as Islam and in countries like China, which operates under a one-party system. Before the French Revolution, most political thinkers were critical of democracy as a form of government. For example, Plato (360 B.C.) argued that an appeal to the majority was not appropriate because the majority lacks the knowledge to govern a society. Furthermore, he pointed out that leaders would become dependent on the people's re-election, and thus necessary decisions would not be made.
But what is democracy? The etymological origin of democracy can be traced back to the Greek “demos,” meaning people, and “kratos,” meaning rule. Thus, democracy means rule by the people. A society is democratic when it is the people, and only the people, who govern. However, this is not necessarily a precise enough definition of what democracy is. To expand on the definition, it can be said that a government is democratic when all decisions, X, and alternative decisions, non-X, are: (1) supported by the fact that a majority of the people relevantly indicate that they prefer X, so X constitutes the content of the political decision, and (2) if a majority of the people preferred non-X, then non-X would have constituted the final political decision.
Further clarifications of the concept of democracy can be made. For example, in cases where the majority must choose between more than two decisions, a majority in this situation is understood as the decision most people prefer. It can also be argued that a democratic government must consider a “winner takes all” system. Therefore, it may be relevant to replace “majority” with “a suitably qualified majority” in the understanding of democracy. Finally, it must also be pointed out that the will of the people must be expressed in a relevant way, where voting might be applicable. When discussing democracy, a distinction can be made between aggregative democracies and deliberative democracies. The former deals with how political institutions should be organized and how preferences can be expressed—that is, aggregated and transformed into political decisions. Here, the focus is on the quantitative aspect of democracy and how votes can be expressed—and transformed into political decisions—in an appropriate manner. The goal here is to ensure the people's rule and protect their interests from tyranny. Deliberative democracies, on the other hand, are described as having a more qualitative focus, as they emphasize how preferences and decisions can be shaped through active citizenship. Deliberative democracy is communication-oriented and focuses on how decisions can be justified through communicative rationality.
One of the problems with making democratic decisions is defining who constitutes the people—and whether this meta-order is democratic. Therefore, a democratic government must define who the people are but also delineate those who are not part of the government. Based on this reasoning, it could be pointed out that the delineation must also be done democratically. However, this calls for a higher-order constitutive decision, which does not solve the presented problem. Any democratic process, for example, majority decisions, requires us to know who falls within the democratic domain. There is a circularity here, since the democratic process requires that we already know who may participate in it. In an attempt to understand who constitutes the people in a democratic society, various principles have been formulated. One of these principles is the impact principle, which implies that a person is part of the government when the outcome of a political decision affects them. However, there are several problems with this principle, as people can be affected differently, and it can be difficult to judge who is affected if the outcome of a political decision is not yet evident. Based on the impact principle, one could also consider whether a nation-state fulfills this democratic principle. For example, when we look at cross-border pollution, it can be argued that there are people outside a given nation-state who are affected by the decisions of others. The impact principle can also lead us to reflect on whether we should include children or the severely mentally handicapped in the definition of the electorate, as they too can be affected by relevant policies.
Another principle formulated in an attempt to define the people in a democratic government consists of the subject principle. This principle states that a person is part of the people if they are subject to the outcome of a given political decision. For example, a Dane can be affected by Swedish energy policy, but they are not subject to Swedish legislation when residing in Denmark. The advantage of the subject principle is that it can be easier to judge who is subject to a political decision rather than who is affected.
Robert Goodin views a democracy as a group of people who make collective decisions in a democratic manner. However, Goodin's question is how we specifically define this group that makes collective decisions. He terms this challenge as "the problem of constituting the demos." Robert Dahl also argues that the question of who constitutes the people and who has the right to govern over the people is a problem that many democratic political philosophers have not sufficiently addressed.
The Mechanics of Tolerance—Objection, Acceptance, and Rejection
The concept of tolerance reflects a conviction that a policy should not hinder values or practices that one personally finds wrong. Even if there is a real possibility to prohibit a given practice, one should not do so, in order to be tolerant of other practices, values, and beliefs.
To further define the concept of tolerance, it can be argued that it comprises several components. The objection component involves opposition to certain objectionable practices or beliefs, such as religious fundamentalism. The acceptance component entails recognizing and respecting others' rights and freedoms, even if one personally disagrees with their views or practices, such as accepting the right to freedom of assembly or showing tolerance towards sex workers.
The rejection component highlights that tolerance has its limits; for example, practices like forced marriage or beliefs that view women and children as property should be rejected to prevent harm, exploitation, or crime. The scope of tolerance can be understood through a shared agreement on fundamental principles like democracy and rights, an indifference to various commercial lifestyles, and a spectrum of reactions ranging from repulsion, such as in the display of bad manners, to justified objections to practices deemed fundamentally wrong, like religious fundamentalism.
It is thus an objection, but the acceptance component makes it tolerated. Finally, the limit of the scope of tolerance is reached when it comes to something that should be rejected. According to the rejection component, within a tolerant society, we may be interested in rejecting practices such as forced marriage. Reasons for tolerance can be said to concern the acceptance component. Here, there is an acceptance of values, beliefs, and practices, even if there is a justified objection. In this context, two types of reasons can be highlighted:
Pragmatic reasons: These are based on the perspective of the tolerant, where strategic or consequentialist considerations emerge.
Principled reasons: These concern the perspective of the tolerated.
Firstly, pragmatic reasons can include arguments such as the peace argument, which permits certain practices to maintain a stable social order. The reasoning here is that the costs of prohibiting a given social practice could create instability—and thus disrupt peace. Another argument under pragmatic reasons is the rational belief argument, which points out that beliefs, practices, and values cannot be changed through coercion—thus it is not rational to use coercion and prohibition.
Additionally, there is the truth argument, which points out that truth and knowledge arise when society has certain freedoms such as freedom of expression. Here, the fallibility argument can point out that excluding the opposition involves an unconstructive assumption that one is infallible. Thus, it is important that knowledge and truth can unfold in a society that can accommodate different viewpoints and values.
When we look at principled reasons, we can include the harm argument (also known as the harm principle). According to thinkers like Mill, it can be argued that a form of paternalistic coercion over the individual should only be exercised if a person will harm others. Prohibition cannot be justified with a paternalistic reasoning—that something is done for the individual's own good. Additionally, we can highlight the respect argument under principled reasons, which states that everyone must be considered morally and politically equal. Therefore, there must be neutrality between the differing views of what the good actually is. The respect argument also points out that public reasons can form the basis for prohibition.
Pragmatic reasons are thus seen from the perspective of the tolerant, such as the majority or those in power. Here, we are concerned with what is termed vertical tolerance. Principled reasons, on the other hand, focus on the perspective of the tolerated, which can be termed the general perspective. Here, we are concerned with horizontal tolerance, how we can tolerate each other. Tolerance as a moral virtue refers, therefore, to the personal quality that enables individuals to endure and respect differences, even when they disagree with or dislike certain behaviors, beliefs, or practices.
Bibliography
Anderson, E. (2004). Against luck egalitarianism: What is the point of equality? In M. Clayton & A. Williams (Eds.), Social justice (pp. 154-185). Malden, MA; Oxford, UK; Victoria, Australia: Blackwell.
Arneson, R. J. (1989). Equality and equal opportunity for welfare. Philosophical Studies, 56, 77-93.
Casal, P. (2007). Why sufficiency is not enough. Ethics, 117(2), 296-326.
Chambers, S. (2010). Secularism minus exclusion: Developing a religious-friendly idea of public reason. The Good Society, 19(2), 16-21.
Cohen, G. A. (2011). How to do political philosophy. In G. A. Cohen (Ed.), On the currency of egalitarian justice, and other essays in political philosophy (pp. 225-235). Princeton University Press.
Galeotti, A. E. (2006). Identity, difference, toleration. In J. S. Dryzek, B. Honig, & A. Phillips (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political theory (pp. 564-580). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodin, R. (2007). Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35(1), 40-68.
Hojlund, A.-S. (2021). What should egalitarian policies express? The case of paternalism. Journal of Political Philosophy, 29(4), 519-538.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., Midtgaard, S. F., Nielsen, L., & Olsen, T. V. (2020). Politisk teori og filosofi. DJØF Forlag.
McBride, C. (2017). Religion, respect, and public reason. Ethnicities, 17(2), 205-219.
Moreau, S. (2010). What is discrimination? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38(2), 143-179.
Nielsen, L. (2013). Om metoden i normativ politologi. Politik, 16(3), 45-54.
Nozick, R. (2013). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities: The human development approach. Harvard University Press.
Okin, S. M. (1999). Is multiculturalism bad for women? In J. Cohen, M. Howard, & M. C. Nussbaum (Eds.), Is multiculturalism bad for women? (pp. 9-24). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice (2nd ed.). Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press.
Sandel, M. J. (1984). The procedural republic and the unencumbered self. Political Theory, 12(1), 81-96.
Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(1), 229-243.
Zellentin, A. (2015). Compensation for historical emissions and excusable ignorance. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 32(3), 258-274.
Zellentin, A. (2020). Climate change and international ethics. In B. Schippers (Ed.), The Routledge handbook to rethinking ethics in international relations (pp. 195-205). Routledge.